Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
Nation have the capability to work efficiently and effectively together, using a national approach to domestic incident management." 3 In HSPD-5, the President tasked the Secretary of Homeland Security (SHS) to "develop… and administer a National Incident Management System (NIMS)." 4 The NIMS would "provide a consistent nationwide approach for Federal, state, and local governments to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity." 5 It also directed the SHS to develop and administer a National Response Plan (NRP), to "integrate Federal Government domestic prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery plans into one all-discipline, all-hazards plan." The NRP provided for a phased implementation, including a 60 day phase I period to transition, and a 60 day Phase II period for modifying existing plans to align with the NRP. After the first two phases, the NRP would be fully implemented and DHS would "conduct systematic assessments of coordinating structures, processes, and protocols implemented for actual INS, national-level homeland security exercises, and National Special Security Events (NSSEs)" to "gauge the plan's effectiveness in meeting objectives of HSPD-5." 13 The NRP is based on several planning assumptions. One assumption is that "incidents are typically managed at the lowest possible geographic, organizational, and jurisdictional level." 14 Another assumption is that "the combined expertise and capabilities of government at all levels, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations will be required to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from INS." 15 A third assumption is that an INS may "overwhelm capabilities of State, local, and tribal governments, and private-sector infrastructure owners and operators." 16 The NRP defines an INS as "an actual or potential high-impact event that requires robust coordination of the Federal response in order to save lives and minimize damage, and provides the basis for long-term community and economic recovery. Hurricane Katrina provided the first requirement to respond to an INS after the implementation of the NRP. It was also the first wide-scale use of the National Guard in a Title 32 status in response to an INS. Such use was enabled by the addition of chapter 9 to Title 32 of the U.S. Code. While this paper is not intended to be an after action review of the response to Hurricane Katrina, it will examine the actions taken related to the use of the National Guard.
On 26 August, three days before Katrina made its final landfall, "the Louisiana National Although it is presumably intended to enable a more rapid response, and to enable unity of command, it could have the opposite result. This should be an option of last resort only, and deployment of National Guard forces in this capacity should be avoided for several reasons.
First, in accordance with the NRP, the state and local efforts normally begin prior to provision of Federal assistance. Therefore, actions to respond under state authority with Guard assets will typically already be in progress before initiation of the Federal response. Second, the state or territorial governors and National Guard leaders know what capabilities they have available, and the impact of deploying those capabilities to another area. Third, the governors have the authority to order the specific National Guard Soldiers and Airmen that are needed to duty for the response. In many situations, the response force needs to be tailored to the situation, and this can best be done by the leadership within each state. Attempting to manage this through the respective service channels would likely cause unnecessary delays in getting Guard 83 The paperwork involves a formal request from the affected state for specific support, and an estimate of cost generated by the supporting state if they determine they can support the request. The requesting state then has to approve the costs to create a legally binding document. Although this system has proven to be effective in small-scale response situations, this cumbersome process led to delays in the National Guard response to Hurricane Katrina.
In order to mitigate the delays, and to facilitate a more rapid and robust response, LTG H.
Steven Blum, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and LTG Clyde Vaughn decided to initiate a 'push' system to get more National Guard Soldiers and Airmen on their way to the affected area. LTG Blum "held a video teleconference on 31 August to solicit assistance from each of the 54 states and territories for both Louisiana and Mississippi. States responded rapidly to the urgent need and decided to worry about the authorizing paperwork later." 84 "Since these forces were activated in state-to-state agreements they were on state active duty and subject to the rules and entitlements authorized by their respective home states." The degree to which the response was impaired is difficult to determine, but with thousands of Guard Soldiers and Airmen gone from their respective states in the incident area, the immediate reaction was smaller than it normally would have been. There were enough
Guardsmen available nation-wide, and the proactive steps taken by the NGB leadership quickly compensated for the shortfalls in the JOA. Equipment shortages exacerbated by deployments also had an impact on the response. 97 "It has been suggested before that the National Guard be reorganized to focus on domestic missions." Four compelling reasons against using the National Guard under this exception were provided.
The second change expanded the role of National Guard CSTs, which was assessed as a positive change. Despite the changes, three broad significant issues remain to be addressed.
The first issue is that a "pull" system creates delays during a response to an INS. The second issue is that there was a lack of unity of command and unity of effort between National Guard serving under state authority, and DoD elements serving under authority of the President. The third issue is that the ability of the National Guard to respond was impaired by involvement in the Global War on Terrorism, and other Federal missions. Each issue was supported with discussion to further explain the issue. The National Guard should continue to fill a critical role in the response to an INS. The need exists for better integration and coordination with other departments and agencies.
Implementing the recommendations will enhance the capability of the National Guard to respond, and will generate a more effective and efficient overall response to future INS. 23 Ibid. The classes of the militia are -(1) the organized militia, which consists of the National Guard and the Naval Militia; and (2) the unorganized militia, which consists of members of the militia 51 52 On 27 August 2005, Governor Kathleen Blanco sent a letter to President Bush requesting an emergency declaration for the State of Louisiana. The letter stated, "I have determined that this incident is of such severity and magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the State and affected local governments, and that supplementary Federal assistance is necessary to save lives, protect property, public health, and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a disaster." The letter contained a list of "State and local resources that have been or will be used to alleviate the conditions of this emergency." It also certified that "the State and local governments will assume all applicable non-Federal share of costs required by the Stafford Act." Governor Blanco specifically requested "emergency protective measures, direct Federal Assistance, Individual and Household Program (IHP) assistance, Special Needs Program assistance, and debris removal" for all affected areas. She defined the affected areas as "all the southeastern parishes including the New Orleans Metropolitan area and the mid-state Interstate I-49 corridor and northern parishes along the I-20 corridor that are accepting the thousands of citizens evacuating . 
